Modelling unemployment insurance: a survey

Intro -- Contents -- Chapter 1: Introduction -- References -- Chapter 2: The Starting Points -- 2.1 The Optimal Benefit Level: Martin Neil Baily (1978) -- 2.2 The Time Sequence of UI Benefits: Shavell and Weiss (1979) -- 2.3 Job Search Decisions: Dale T. Mortensen (1977) -- References -- Chapter 3: The Optimal Level of Unemployment Insurance -- 3.1 Productivity Gains from an Unemployment Insurance System -- 3.1.1 UI Systems and Productive Efficiency: Acemoglu and Shimer (1999) -- 3.1.2 A Note on the Quantitative Relevance of Productivity Gains from a UI System -- 3.1.3 More on the Analytical Issue of Productivity Gains from UI Benefits: Daron Acemoglu (2001) -- 3.1.4 The `Search Subsidy´ Provided by the UI System: Marimon and Zilibotti (1999) -- 3.2 The Sufficient Statistics Approach to the Analysis of Optimal UI Policy: Chetty´s Contributions -- 3.2.1 The Generalization of Baily´s Result: Ray Chetty (2006) -- 3.2.2 Moral Hazard and Liquidity Effects in the Design of the Optimal UI Benefits: Ray Chetty (2008) -- 3.3 New Issues for the Design of the Optimal Level of Unemployment Insurance -- 3.3.1 Age-Dependent Structure of the Optimal Unemployment Insurance -- 3.3.2 Asset Testing and Unemployment Insurance Systems -- 3.3.3 The Optimal UI Design in the Presence of Biased Beliefs: Spinnewijn (2015) -- 3.4 Externalities and Corrections of Baily-Chetty Result -- 3.4.1 A New and Wider Macroeconomic Framework to Designing Optimal UI: Landais et al. (2018a, b) -- 3.4.2 Unemployment Insurance in the Presence of `Negative Duration Dependence´: Lehr (2017) -- References -- Chapter 4: The Optimal Time Profile of UI Policy -- 4.1 The Optimal Time Profile of UI Within a Partial Equilibrium Setting -- 4.1.1 The Optimal Time Sequence of UI Benefits and a Tax after Re-employment -- 4.1.2 Human Capital Depreciation -- 4.1.3 New References and Ideas for UI Policy.

4.1.4 New Scenarios in Designing the Time Profile of UI Policy -- 4.1.5 Returning to the Time Profile of Unemployment Insurance -- 4.2 The Optimal Time Sequence of UI Within a General Equilibrium Setting -- 4.2.1 The Time Profile of UI Schema within a General Equilibrium Model of Search Unemployment: Peter Fredriksson and Bertil Ho... -- 4.2.2 Optimal UI with Monitoring and Sanctions within a General Equilibrium Model of Search Unemployment: Boone, Fredriksson, ... -- 4.2.3 Doubts about a Decreasing Time Profile of UI Benefits within a General Equilibrium Search Model: Pierre Cahuc and Etienn... -- 4.2.4 Strategic Wage Bargaining and Time Profile of UI Benefits: Melvyn Coles and Adrian Masters (2006) -- 4.3 A New Dynamic Design of an Optimal UI Policy -- 4.3.1 The ``Optimal Timing´´ of UI Benefits: Kolsrud et al. (2018) -- References -- Chapter 5: Unemployment Insurance Over the Business Cycles -- 5.1 Business Cycles and the Time Sequence of UI Benefits: Juan Sanchez (2008) -- 5.2 UI and Marginal Welfare Gains Over the Business Cycle: Kory Kroft and Matthew Notowidigdo (2016) -- 5.3 Business Cycles and Unemployment Insurance within a Static Model: Torben Andersen and Michael Svarer (2011) -- 5.4 A General Equilibrium Approach to the Unemployment Insurance Policy Over the Business Cycle: Kurt Mitman and Stanislav Rab... -- 5.5 Busisness Cycles and UI: The Empirical Applications of L-M-S (2018a) Model of Optimal UI -- 5.6 The Optimal UI Policy in the Face of a Covid-19-type Recession: Kurt Mitman and Stanislav Rabinovich (2021) -- References -- Chapter 6: Some Further Notes on the Role of the UI System -- 6.1 Selected Empirical Analyses -- 6.2 Opposite Forces Driving the Re-employment Job Quality: Nekoei and Weber (2017) -- References -- Chapter 7: Conclusions -- References.